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Projections of the future national-
security environment are always 
laden with uncertainty and ambiguity. 
However, they help to serve an early- 
warning function concerning emergent 
threats and the national capabilities 
that will be required to respond to 
them. With this in mind, I would like to 
offer a reconceptualization of the 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review, or QDR, 
threat categories by viewing these 
threat potentials through a modified 
perceptual lens.
The current QDR threat categories 
are based on a four-square box that 
has irregular challenges in the upper 
left-hand corner and, in a clockwise 
fashion, catastrophic challenges, 
disruptive challenges and traditional 
challenges listed in turn. The threats 
are shown migrating away from tradi-
tional challenges into the other three 
squares of the box. Specific areas of 
concern are the need to defeat ter-
rorist networks, prevent acquisition 
or use of WMD, defend homeland in 
depth, and shape choices of countries 
at strategic crossroads. At the same 
time, the model recognizes that the 
United States must “sustain 
its capabilities to address 
traditional challenges.”
Earlier thinking by Frank 
Hoffman in Armed Forces Jour-
nal International also ques-
tions the 2006 QDR threat 
modeling:
Rather than the simplistic 
quad chart found in the new 
National Defense Strategy, fu-
ture scenarios will more likely 
present unique combinational 
or hybrid threats specifi-
cally designed to target U.S. 
vulnerabilities. Conventional, 
irregular and catastrophic 
terrorist challenges will not be distinct 
styles — they will all be present in 
some form. This could include states 
blending high-tech capabilities, such 
as anti-satellite weapons, with ter-
rorism and cyber-warfare directed 
against financial targets. … Oppo-
nents will be capable of what Marine 
Lt. Gen. James Mattis has called 
“hybrid wars.”1
Articulating such “combinational 
or hybrid threats” is an important 
step forward in our understanding 
of QDR threat categories, yet further 
reconceptualization is still warranted. 
I would suggest that a better way 
of viewing these threat categories 
is through a modified diagram that 
factors in each category (irregular, 
catastrophic, disruptive and tradition-
al challenges) from the perspective of 
threat level and time. Such additional 
modeling provides an iterated, rather 
than a static, perspective on national-
security threats and allows us to 
gauge or measure their perceived level 
of severity. Such a visual reinterpre-
tation would include hybrid threats 
as an additional component to the 
original QDR threat categories. 
Using this perceptual lens, we 
can think of warfare as transitioning 
from the modern to the post-modern 
era — just as the political and eco-
nomic systems are doing. Examples 
include the rise of challengers to the 
nation-state form (e.g., al-Qaeda and 
drug cartels), endemic state fail-
ure, the European Union attempt at 
creating a post-Westphalian regional 
state, the rise of informational and 
bio-technical economies, mass mi-
gration to the Internet (cyberspace) 
and increasing globalization.
As an outcome of this epochal 
transition — a revolution in political 
and military affairs — the traditional 
challenges of the modern era are becom-
ing less significant threats, even more 
so given the U.S. domination of conven-
tional warfare. As we begin the transition 
into the post-modern era — as one hu-
man civilization comes to an end and 
another begins — irregular challenges 
become the greatest threat to U.S. 
national-security interests. 
This transitional period is marked 
by de-instutionalization, privitization 
and outsourcing. Govern-
mental institutions are no 
longer able to contend with 
changing times because of 
changes in all aspects of hu-
man civilization, including 
the technological, organiza-
tional and legal realms. These 
changes include the return to 
the battlefield, and probable 
ascendancy, of nonstate sol-
diers — terrorists, insurgents, 
guerrillas, mercenaries and 
private security contractors. 
Eventually, as this his-
torical process continues 
through the coming decades 
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and we begin to enter the post-mod-
ern era, disruptive challenges will 
become the most significant threat to 
U.S. national-security interests. This 
will come about as post-nation states 
re-instutionalize nonstate soldiers and 
their network structures, advanced 
weaponry and concepts of operations 
into their forces. 
Catastrophic challenges are an in-
teresting case, in that they should not 
be considered so much a stand-alone 
challenge as an additive threat (or 
plus-up) to the traditional, irregular 
and disruptive challenges that exist. 
For instance, terrorists with tactical 
nuclear devices are a far greater threat 
to the U.S. than terrorists employing 
conventional explosive devices. 
Additionally, when viewing potential 
foreign-state threats, such as those 
from Beijing, while it is understood 
that a sequence of challenges will dom-
inate over time — first traditional (the 
past), second irregular (the present) 
and third disruptive (the future), each 
modified by catastrophic challenges (as 
an additive threat) — this would not 
limit Beijing or any other state from 
using each challenge in a separate 
and discrete manner. 
Rather, in the threat mixes ad-
vocated in the well-known mainland 
Chinese work Unrestricted Warfare, 
these challenges should be mixed and 
matched in such a way as to tailor 
them to specific situations. A prime ex-
ample would be the layering of irregu-
lar and disruptive challenges, such as 
proxy terrorists’ use of directed-energy 
weapons (the Chinese ZM-87 blind-
ing laser comes to mind) against U.S. 
civil-aviation assets as an asymmetric 
response to the future fielding of U.S. 
man-portable air-defense-systems 
countermeasures.
Such “mixed-threat challenges” 
have been discussed recently in an 
article by retired Marine Lieuten-
ant Colonel F.G. Hoffman, who says, 
“Our greatest challenge will not come 
from a state that selects one approach 
but from states or groups that select 
from the whole menu of tactics and 
technologies to meet their own strate-
gic culture and geography.”2 None of 
this is all that new in the sense that 
combined-arms approaches (infantry, 
artillery and cavalry) have a centuries-
old history in the military arts. The 
only difference with these threat mixes 
is that they abstract things further 
by mixing and matching nonmilitary 
methods to military methods in “any-
thing goes” combinations. 
The utility of this reconceptualiza-
tion of the 2006 QDR challenges model 
is that it better defines and articulates 
the national-security threats facing 
the U.S. It allows the time and inten-
sity of threat concerns to be visually 
portrayed, views catastrophic threats 
as an additive (or plus-up) capacity to 
the other challenges, and takes into 
consideration the mixing and match-
ing of hybrid threats.
Ultimately, what this model sug-
gests is that, while the U.S. is well-po-
sitioned to fight the modern wars of the 
past against nation-states, it is now 
required to field an epochal transition-
al capability to fight the irregular wars 
of the present against nonstate threats, 
while further keeping one eye to the 
future, when it will be required to en-
gage in the new “conventional” warfare 
against post nation-state forms. 
All might agree that we live in very 
interesting times. 
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